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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
D. CLARK WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MERRILL L. OLDROYD, GERALD CARTER 
and JOHN A. CANTO, 
) 
Defendants and Appellants. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15313 
This is an action for damages in trespass and to 
quiet title to certain real property located in Utah 
County, Utah. Defendants denied generally and counter-
claimed to quiet title to said property in defendant 
Gerald Carter, seeking reformation of certain deeds on 
the alleged bases of mutual mistake and boundary by ac-
quiescence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, 
District Judge. By stipulation in open court, the action 
was dismissed against defendant Merrill L. Oldroyd. On 
February 14, 1977, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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were made and judgment entered against the remaining defer,-
dants. Defendants then filed a Motion to Amend Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law or, in the Alternative, 
for a New Trial. This motion was denied on June 13, 1977, 
and defendants Gerald Carter and John A. Canto have appeak 
from the entry of judgment and denial of the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set out in appellants' brief, although come 
in most respects, are incomplete in that they fail to set 
out all material evidence presented at trial. Such failuu 
creates a serious problem, since this appeal is essen-
tially an attack upon the sufficiency of evidence to suppor: 
findings made by the trial court. A great portion of ilie 
testimony adduced at trial was vigorously disputed. In ore, 
to enable this court to determine whether the trial court 
had sufficient evidence to find as it did, a more complete 
summary of the evidence must be provided. Accordingly, 
respondent presents the following Statement of Facts: 
This dispute concerns a parcel of real property lo-
cated north of U.S. Highway 50-6 in Spanish Fork Canyon. 
Respondent D. Clark Williams was raised on the property 
now in dispute, it being the old family homestead (Tr. 
In 1935, Williams gained title to a substantial amount 0 ' 
-2-
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acreage in the area, including the disputed property and 
surrounding land (Tr. SO). From that time until the 
present, he has paid all taxes on the property in dis-
pute (Tr. 51). On May 22, 1954, Williams conveyed a por-
tion of his property to himself, Clifton Huff and Dennis L. 
Prince, a partnership doing business as Skyline Enterprises 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). Williams retained property ad-
joining the "Skyline" property on the north and east. 
This retained property included land on both sides of 
Tie Fork Creek, which runs roughly parallel to the eastern 
Skyline boundary. 
The deed conveying the Skyline property describes 
it as a rectangular parcel 300 feet deep and 1,560 feet 
long, bordering the northerly edge of U.S. Highway 50-6. 
Unbeknown to anyone for over 20 years, the deed descrip-
tion contained a latent ambiguity in that the initial rnetes-
and-bounds call conflicts with the call to the highway 
(Tr. 7, 10, 13, 21, etc.). This ambiguity was discovered 
in 1974, when Williams commissioned a survey by Engineering 
Associates (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16). Following the gen-
erally accepted survey assumption that a call to a fixed 
monument (in this case, the highway) prevails over a con-
flicting metes-and-bounds call, Engineering Associates 
set the point of beginning in the northerly highway line 
and thereby established the boundary line. The survey 
showed that the easterly Skyline boundary lies approxi-
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mately 100 feet west of Tie Fork Creek (Tr. 19) and that 
the northerly boundary lies 300 feet north of and parallel 
to the highway. 
A map (Defendants' Exhibit 21) prepared for appellanb 
by Surveying Associates, Inc., graphically illustrates the 
deed discrepancy and the area in dispute, and it is reprol"_ 
herein as Appendix 1. The map shows the actual deed descrip-
tion in red lines, the description as adjusted by EngineerL 
Associates in blue lines, and the area claimed by appellants 
in yellow lines (the easterly yellow line following Tie For-
Creek) . The disputed area has been shaded in yellow for 
illustrative purposes. 
Following the May 22, 1954 conveyance, Skyline 
Enterprises built a motel, service station and cafe on its 
property. Williams, who was an active member of the partne:-
ship and a principal stockholder and president of the partr.i 
ship's successor corporation, Skyview Enterprises, Inc. 
(Tr. 112), testified that Skyline Enterprises never occu-
pied the area now in dispute (Tr. 113), and the record is 
devoid of evidence that Skyline Enterprises, rather than 
Williams himself, as owner of the adjoining land, allowed 
anyone to go upon the disputed area. 
Following the 1954 conveyance, in addition to paying 
property taxes, Williams made the following uses of the 
disputed area: 
(a) He granted a pole line easement to Utah Power 
-4-
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& Light Company in August 1954 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 44); 
(b) In a conveyance of certain other lands to the 
Spanish Fork Livestock Association in 1961 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1), he expressly excepted therefrom the property 
conveyed to Skyline Enterprises, and in addition, re-
tained " ... all that land within the premises between the 
northerly boundary of U.S. Highway 50-6, and the southerly 
boundary of D&RGW Railroad ... ," viz., the disputed pro-
perty; 
(c) He parked in the disputed area while deer 
hunting (Tr. 90) and held a family reunion on the pro-
perty (Tr. 97); 
(d) He planted crested wheatgrass and other grasses 
(Tr. 149); and 
(e) He obtained a permit in 1973 to clean, repair 
or deepen an existing well (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20), in 
order to build a summer home and ready the land for de-
velopers (Tr. 48-49). 
In 1961, Dr. Merrill Oldroyd, a defendant in the 
original action, purchased stock in Skyview Enterprises, 
Inc., which now owned the Skyline property. Oldroyd 
testified at trial that before he bought into the 
corporation, \villiams represented to him that the Skyline 
boundaries were as represented by the yellow lines in 
Appendix 1, i.e., along Tie Fork Creek to the east and 
the D&RGW Railroad right-of-way to the north, inter alia 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Tr. 238239) . Williams flatly denied having made these 
representations (Tr. 119). 
Subsequently, Dr. Oldroyd and his family became the 
owners of all the stock of Skyview Enterprises, Inc. 
(Tr. 119-220, 239); and on July 16, 1963, the corporation 
entered into a contract to sell the Skyline property to 
Lloyd Horlacher and Elda Horlacher. According to the Horlac 
testimony, Williams made boundary representations to them 
which were identical to those he had allegedly made to 
Oldroyd (Tr. 207, 215, 261). Again, Williams stoutly denie, 
ever having made the representations (Tr. 121, 122). 
At the time the Horlachers went into possession, 
Williams moved to Salt Lake City and did not return to the 
property until 1970 (Tr. 122, 124). During the interim, 
the Horlachers placed trailer hookups precisely along the 
easterly deed boundary and north into the disputed area, 
cleared some brush from the disputed area, placed a coup~ 
of outhouses along the creek, and attempted to plant the 
disputed area with lawn seed, which did not grow (Tr. 18, 
217-21). The Horlachers never notified Williams of these 
infringements on his property (Tr. 220). 
In 1966, Mrs. Hor lacker (since divorced) assigned her 
interest in the real estate contract to her son, appellant 
Gerald Carter (Defendants' Exhibit 36). Carter went inW 
possession of the Skyline property at that time and re111a 1 
on the property through the commencement of this action. 
-6-
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When Williams returned to his property in 1970, he dis-
covered that certain electrical hookups were in the disputed 
area. He told Carter that he, Carter, was trespassing and 
requested that he remove the posts, all but one of which 
were subsequently pulled out (Tr. 124). 
In 1973 a dispute arose over the boundary between the 
Skyline property and Williams' land. At that time Williams 
and Carter paced off the deed footage (Tr. 92). Although 
apparently agreeing that the Skyline property was 300 feet 
deep, the parties disagreed concerning the easterly boun-
dary, Williams arguing that it ran west of the creek (Tr. 
93). Carter then offered to buy the disputed property from 
Williams (Tr. 93); in fact, Carter admitted at trial that he 
offered to buy the disputed property from Williams on at 
least two occasions (Tr. 309, 315). 
In the summer of 1974, ignoring Williams' claim to the 
property, and ignoring the footages which he and Williams 
had paced off, Carter employed appellant Canto to grade the 
disputed area, together with part of the Skyline property. 
During the course of grading the Skyline property, but 
before commencing work on the disputed land, Canto parked 
his equipment in the disputed area. Williams happened to 
come by (although living in Spanish Fork, Tr. 43, he used the 
property extensively for outings with his daughter, Tr. 105) 
and told Canto that Canto's equipment and camp were on his 
property. Williams testified that had he known that Canto 
-7-
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intended to tear up the property, he would have forbid hin 
to begin work (Tr. 129). 
Canto, following Carter's instructions, proceeded to 
grade the disputed area in August 1974. In the course of 
grading, he totally removed the vegetation and topsoil (up 
to 17 inches in places) from the disputed area (Tr. 152 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22), altered the area's drainage into 
the stream (Tr. 142), and buried a patch of willows at 
streamside (Tr. 145) As a result, undesirable weeds have 
taken over (Tr. 159) and the stream has become polluted (Tr. 
154) 
On August 16, 1974, Williams discovered the damage wher. 
he conunissioned the Engineering Associates survey (Tr. 94). 
He inunediately commenced this lawsuit, seeking to quiet 
title and recover damages in trespass. 
At trial Williams presented evidence of damages on two 
theories: cost of restoration and diminution in market 
value.· To support his testimony, as landowner, concerning 
the damage done by grading, Williams relied on expert test1· 
many by Grant Williams, a land management expert, and Esbe'~ 
Baadsgaard, a licensed real estate broker who presented 
testimony concerning sales of similar parcels of land. 
Appellants offered no rebuttal evidence on the issue of 
damages. 
Following trial, at which the action was dismissed 
against defendant Oldroyd, the court ruled in favor of 
-8-
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pl3intiff \hlliams, quieting title to the disputed property 
in \'Iilliams and granting him damages in the sum of $6,690.00, 
representing the property's diminution in value as a result 
of the trespass. Defendants Carter and Canto have appealed 
this ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO REFORM THE 
SUBJECT DEED AS REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS. 
Appellants' first contention in seeking reversal is 
that the trial court's refusal to reform the subject deed 
was in error, because (1) the deed description is erroneous; 
(2) the evidence shows that the parties to the original 
(May 22, 1954) deed were mutually mistaken in giving and 
taking an instrument containing an erroneous description, 
and (3) Dr. Oldroyd, the Horlachers and Carter relied on 
alleged boundary representations by Williams in occupying 
the disputed area. 
In analyzing appellants' contentions, it is important 
to note four basic rules of appellate review to which this 
court has staunchly adhered: (1) that the appellate 
court indulges the findings and judgment of the trial 
court with a presumption of validity and correctness; 
(2) that the appellate court reviews the record in a light 
favorable to those findings and judgment; (3) that it does 
not disturb the findings and judgment if they find substan-
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tial support in the evidence, and (4) that it requires 
appellant to sustain the burden of showing error. R. C. 
Tolman Const. Co. v. Myton Water Ass'n., 563 P.2d 780, 782 
(Utah 1977) . 
The rationale underlying this broad deference to the 
trial court is explained in the leading deed reformation 
case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571, 581 
(1950) : 
The trial court is in a more favorable sit-
uation to deal with many of the imponderables 
arising in a trial of an action than we are. 
We acknowledge his vantage point on such 
things as demeanor and credibility and we 
realize that the "live show" he watches is 
far more effective in disclosing the ulti-
mate truths than are the typewritten pages 
of a transcript. We appreciate his better 
opportunities for searching out inaccuracies, 
untruths, exaggerations and concealed bias or 
interest and if we are to fully accept his 
advantageous position we must allow him 
some latitude in giving weight to elements 
we are unable to evaluate. 
A review of the lengthy transcript of the instant case 
reveals that nearly every material fact, except evidence 
concerning damages, was disputed, especially with respect· 
testimony concerning Williams' alleged boundary represe~ 
tations to Dr. Oldroyd and the Horlachers (see, e.g., Tr. 
119-22, 214, 238, 261). Under such circumstances, this c~ 
should not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. 
After weighing the witnesses' conflicting testimony, 
the trial court ruled as follows in its Memorandum Dec is• 
-10-
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of January 27, 1977: "The court does not find sufficient 
facts to order reformation of the deed, [emphasis 
added]. The decision comports with the long-standing rule 
in Utah that a deed will be reformed only upon a clear 
and convincing showing, as opposed to a mere preponderance, 
that the parties were mutually mistaken in the execution and 
delivery of an instrument at variance with their intent, and 
that the party seeking reformation has not been guilty of 
neglect in the execution of the deed, or of laches in seeking 
relief. Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620 
(1957), and cases cited therein. The "clear and convincing" 
standard is defined in Sine v. Harper, supra, as follows: 
That proof is convincing which carries with 
it, not only the power to persuade the mind 
as to the probable truth or correctness of 
the fact it purports to prove, but has the 
element of clinching such truth or correct-
ness. Clear and convincing proof clinches 
what might be otherwise only probable to 
the mind. 22 P.2d at 581. 
Appellants simply have not met this rigorous burden of 
proof. 
First, appellants argue that since the deed descrip-
tion is erroneous, it should be reformed along lines 
corresponding to their alleged possession. Granted, the 
deed description contains a latent ambiguity [(i.e., one which 
does not appear on the face of the instrument, but is shown to 
exist when the description is applied to the property itself, 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 251 (1965) ], in that although the par-
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eel described is obviously a rectangle 1, 560 feet long and 
300 feet deep, the initial metes-and-bounds call conflicts 
with the call to the northerly line of U.S. Highway 50-6. 
Such an ambiguity does not, however, require the drastic 
remedy of reformation. Instead, the trial court chose 
merely to rely on a basic rule of construction in cases 
involving boundary disputes, i.e., that fixed monuments 
(in this case, the highway) take precedence over calls of 
courses or distances. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 42! 
P.2d 525, 527 (1966). Following this rule, the court allow· 
the boundary line to remain unchanged and did not, as appe:-
lants contend, ". . reform the deed which it said it woulc 
not reform." (Appellants' Brief, 12) 
Of course, had the court desired, it could have ef-
fected a reformation by following the survey description re 
tained in the Engineering Associates' survey commissioned 
by Williams (see Surveyor's Certificate, Plaintiff's Exhib;; 
That description is simply the original boundary line ad-
justed to give precedence to the call to U.S. Highway 50-6. 
Such a boundary line--running west of Tie Fork Creek and 
south of the railroad right-of-way--conforms precisely to: 
mutual intent of the parties to the original deed. 
Quibbling over a latently ambiguous deed description, 
however, will not resolve this controversy. As the Surv~ 
Associates' survey (Defendants' Exhibit 21 and Appendix l 
herein) clearly demonstrates, appellants claim a subston 
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amount of land (yellow lines on exhibit) lying outside 
both the original deed description (red lines) and the de-
scription as corrected to conform to the highway call (blue 
lines) . 
In a roundabout effort to substantiate their claim to 
this unconveyed parcel, appellants argue (Appellants' 
Brief, 12-13) ( 1) that following the original conveyance 
from Williams to Skyline Enterprises, the partnership occupied 
the disputed area, as did its successor corporation, Skyview 
Enterprises, Inc.; (2) that in 1960 or 1961, ~~illiams induced 
Dr. Oldroyd to buy into the corporation by representing the 
boundaries to be as appellants claim; and (3) that Williams, 
who no longer owned any interest in the Skyline property, 
made similar representations to the Horlachers in 1963. None 
of these allegations, even if true, would rise to the level 
of a pre-existing agreement between Williams, as grantor, 
and himself and his associates, doing business as Skyline 
Enterprises, as grantees. For example, assuming arguendo 
that deer hunters and construction workers were allowed to 
park their vehicles and equipment in the disputed area in 
the early Skyline days, as testified by Carter (Tr. 293), 
the record contains no evidence that these uses were per-
mitted by Skyline Enterprises, rather than by \'lilliams 
as sole owner of the property. A hypothetical example will 
illustrate this point: Suppose deer hunters had approached 
Williams while Williams was tending the Skyline gas station, 
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and had received permission to camp on the disputed pro-
perty. Was the permission granted by Williams on behalf 
of Skyline, or by lhlliarns as Skyline's neighbor and the 
property's sole owner? The record is inconclusive. 
A more significant gap in the record is the absence o: 
any of the original grantees, other than Williams, as wit-
nesses at trial. If appellants were truly serious about 
seeking reformation on the basis of a pre-existing agree-
ment, why did they fail to call Clifton Huff as a witness 
(Dennis Price being deceased)? After all, the issue in 
reformation proceedings is what the parties to the instru-
ment mutually intended, not what subsequent takers may spec 
late years after the fact. The trial court was bound to le 
at the transaction as of the time of execution, 66 Am. Jur.; 
Reformation of Instruments, § 5 (1973); without any evidenc 
relating to that point in time, the court could hardly be 
expected to reform the deed on the basis of vague inferenc< 
and self-serving reconstructions. 
Moreover, appellants' attempt to reconstruct an in-
ference of pre-existing agreement and mutual mistake is 
dependent upon findings that Skyline Enterprises actually 
did make the alleged boundary representations. In fact, 
however, each of those allegations was vehemently denied 
by Williams at trial (Tr. 113, 119, 121-22) , and his deni: 
was bolstered by appellant Carter's admission (Tr. 309, 
that on at least two occasions, he attempted to buy the 
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disputed property from Williams. 
Apparently, Judge Sorensen chose to believe respondent 
rather than appellants, as is shown by his Memorandum 
Decision and by the court's Findings of Fact entered on 
February 14, 1977, which stated, at paragraph 5: 
There is no evidence to support a finding that 
plaintiff and the partnership, dba Skyline 
Enterprises, intended any boundary between 
their lands other than [the deed boundary as 
corrected by survey], nor is there sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Skyline 
Enterprises occupied, possessed or claimed 
any of the lands lying north or east of said 
boundary. 
The above finding is exactly contrary to the facts 
selected by appellants, and appellants must rebut that 
finding in order to obtain a reversal on appeal. Their 
position in this respect is identical to that of the appel-
lants in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 
27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), in which the court stated, 
492 P.2d at 133: 
Where the appellant's position is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to make certain 
findings essential to its right to recover, 
and insists that the evidence compels such 
findings, it is obliged to show that there 
is credible and uncontradicted evidence which 
proves those contended facts with such cer-
tainty that all reasonable minds must so 
find. Conversely, if there is any reasonable 
basis, either in the evidence or from the 
Iaekof evidence upon which reasonable minds 
might conclude that they are not so convinced 
by a preponderance of the evidence, then the 
findings should not be overturned [Emphasis 
addeo J. 
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Not one of appellants' asserted facts is undisputed in ti'.~ 
record; to the contrary, it is evident that Judge Sorens~ 
had a reasonable basis in evidence for his finding that 
there was no pre-existing boundary agreement at variance 
with the original deed. 
Finally, even if this court were to accept appellant'' 
view of the facts respecting boundary representations and 
occupation of the disputed area, appellants should nonthe-
less be denied reformation because Oldroyd, the Hor lac hers 
and Carter were all inexcusably negligent in taking their 
respective property interests without questioning the ob~: 
discrepancy between the alleged representations and the de, 
descriptions. A glance at any of the instruments sought'. 
be reformed reveals that the property is a perfect rectans 
1, 560 feet long and 300 feet deep bordering on the highway· 
not the irregularly-shaped chunk which appellants claim wa, 
represented to be their property by Williams. Nonetheless 
Oldroyd took a deed from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., beari: 
the identical description as the initial deed; Oldroyd 
entered into a real estate contract with the Horlachers 
for the same described property; and the Horlachers assi~ 
their interest to Carter using the same description--and 
not one of these people ever bothered to read the instr~ 
he took (Tr. 226, 242, 255), to discuss the matter seric-
with Williams, to commission a survey, or even to pace 
the deed footages. 
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Under Utah law, the issue of inexcusable negligence 
as a defence to reformation is a question of fact to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Petersen v. Eldredge, 
122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 866 (1952). As a general rule, however, 
a finding of inexcusable neglect requires (1) breach of 
legal duty by the party seeking reformation, (2) causing 
prejudice to the other party. McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 
333, 249 P.2d 502 (1952); see generally Annot., 81 A.L.R. 2d 
7, 31-32 (1962). It is evident that Dr. Oldroyd's failure 
to correct the alleged descriptional error when he contracted 
with the Horlachers was a breach of his duty to convey clear 
title. Furthermore, Williams has been prejudiced by the breach 
of duty in that it ultimately resulted in the trespass which 
impelled this lawsuit. 
The conduct of Oldroyd, the Horlachers and Carter with 
respect to the conveyances in question suggests only two 
possible conclusions: either they were inexcusably negligent 
in taking erroneous instruments, or they received exactly 
what they paid for. In either case, the trial court's de-
cision should be affirmed and reformation denied. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO QUIET TITLE 
TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IN APPELLANTS ON THE 
BASIS OF ACQUISITION BY ACQUIESCENCE 
It has been long recognized in Utah that when the true 
boundary bPtween adjoining tracts of land is unknown, un-
C'c'l ta in or in dispute, the respective owners may by parol 
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agreement establish the boundary line and thereby ir-rE'voc0 
bind themselves and their grantees. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Milliner, 120 Utah 2d 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). Appellants 
claim that Williams' alleged boundary representations to 
Oldroyd and the Horlachers constituted such a pu.rol agree-
ment, thereby establishing the claimed boundary. 
Of course, as recently reaffirmed by this court in 
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 
1975) , where the existence of such a boundary agreement is 
in dispute, a boundary may not be established solely on t~ 
basis of an oral agreement, as such an agreement may viola: 
the Statute of Frauds. See also Strickley v. Hill, 22 u~ 
257, 62 P. 893 (1900). 
Instead, the court has endorsed the common law doctri-
of boundary by acquiescence, whereby boundary disputes are 
resolved through an orderly system of presumptions. The 
initial burden of proof lies with the party claiming bound 
by acquiescence, who must prove four elements in order ~ 
raise a presumption that a boundary agreement exists. Thi 
elements are: ( 1) occupation up to a visible line marked 
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings, (2) acquie~ 
in the line as a boundary, ( 3) for a long period of years 
(4) by adjoining land owners. Fuoco v. l'lilliams, 15 Utah 
156, 389 P. 2d 14 3 ( 1964) . If the claimant can thus estat-
lish the presumption of an agreement, the burden shifts 1 
the other party to rebut the presumption by competent e' 
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dence. llov1ever, as emphasized by the court in Fuoco v. 
\'lilliams, supra, 
if the party claiming title by acquiescence 
fails to carry his burden and raise the presump-
tion, then there is no case at all. 389 P.2d 
at 145. 
The court must first, then, analyze each of appellants' 
arguments in the light of the foregoing four elements. 
First, appellants insist that beginning in May 1954, 
Skyline Enterprises and later Skyview Enterprises, Inc., 
occupied the disputed area up to the claimed boundary. 
However, as outlined in Point I of this brief, Williams 
(who was a member of the Skyline Enterprise's partnership) 
denied such occupation; and this court is bound to view 
disputed facts in a light favorable to him, giving deference 
to Judge Sorensen's Memorandum Decision, wherein he did not 
find "sufficient believable facts to establish a boundary 
by acquiescense [sic]. Moreover, the record is de-
void of evidence that Skyline Enterprises, rather than 
Williams as Skyline's neighbor, occupied the property. 
Absent evidence of occupation by Skyline and Skyview while 
respondent had an interest in those entities, occupation 
of the disputed area by appellant Carter's predecessors in 
interest could not have begun earlier than 1963, when 
Williams left the property. 
Furthermore, the requisite occupation must border on 
a visible line ~arked definitely by monuments, fences or 
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buildings. Appellants claim that a fence along Tie Fork 
Creek operated as such a visible line (Appellants' Brief, 
24). The record clearly illustrates, however, that the 
fence was used to hold cattle and horses, rather than to 
fix a boundary (Tr. 97, 1977). Use of the fence for live-
stock control continued throughout the time that Williams' 
brother and expert witness, Grant Williams, was on the 
property (Tr. 176), a period extending from 1954 through 
1967 (Tr. 166-167). As emphasized in appellants' main ca~ 
for the point, Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1974), 
the period of time that a fence exists for livestock cont~ 
purposes . will not constitute part of the 'long peru 
of time' requisite to establish a boundary by acquiescence. 
Accordingly, the alleged occupation, if any, did not begin 
until at least 1967. 
Second, appellants fail to show the requisite acquie~ 
by respondent. Williams testified that he was unaware of: 
encroachment by the Horlachers or Carter before 19 70, as hi 
had left the property when the Horlachers took possession: 
1963 (Tr. 122). Without knowledge, he could not acquies~ 
Irnrnedia tely upon returning, he told Carter that Carter was 
trespassing by placing trailer hookups in the area now in 
dispute (Tr. 124). Later, when Canto parked his caterpill0 
in the area before grading the property, Williams told hi-
that he was camped on Williams' land (Tr. 129). These ,,. 
negate any allegation of acquiescence. 
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Finally, appellants have failed to show acquiescence 
in the line as a boundary for the required period of years. 
Acquiescence, if any, began no earlier than 1963 (when 
Skyview Enterprises, Inc. conveyed the property to the 
Horlachers) and ended when lvilliams commenced this action, 
a total of 11 years. In a lengthy discussion of the period 
of time required under boundary by acquiescence, this court, 
in King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963), pointed 
out that as a general rule, the prescriptive period of twenty 
years is the appropriate yardstick. The court could find 
only two decisions [one of which, Eckberg v. Bates, 121 
Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), is heavily relied upon by 
appellants] which had allowed a period of less than twenty 
years to perfect title by acquiescence. In both, the 
circumstances indicated an ancient boundary obviously existing 
for a period in excess of the prescriptive period. The court 
concluded as follows: 
Boiled down, it seems to us that establish-
ment of boundary by acquiescence may be predi-
cated upon the existence of a visibly monumented 
line persisting for at least twenty years or up-
wards, shown specially or circumstantially, in 
order to meet or exceed the requirements of ac-
quiring rights by prescription . 
. The parade of cases to date calls on 
equity to flex its muscles only to pull the 
period below twenty years in the rarest of 
cases involving the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. 378 P.2d at 897. 
The circumstances of the instant case, including the 
absence of any ancient boundary, clearly do not justify 
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shortening the acquiescence period to infer an agreement 
which never, in fact, existed. 
However, even if this court were to find that appel-
lants have presented sufficient evidence to raise the pre-
sumption that a binding agreement existed, Williams' evide:. 
provides a compelling rebuttal. Between the time that he 
conveyed his property to Skyline Enterprises and the time 
he commenced this action, Williams paid all taxes on the 
disputed property (Tr. 51), granted a pole line easement 
over the disputed property to Utah Power & Light Company 
(plaintiff's Exhibit 44), excluded both the Skyline prope~ 
and the disputed property, separately, in a conveyance of 
other lands to the Spanish Fork Livestock Association 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), parked in the disputed area (Tr.: 
held a family reunion there (Tr. 97), planted the area (Tr. 
149), and obtained a permit to clear an existing well one 
property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20) . Plainly, Williams neve 
acted in keeping with the alleged "agreement." Neither,r 
appears, did appellant Carter, who admitted that he attem:· 
to buy the disputed property from Williams on at least t'.·:~ 
occasions (Tr. 309, 315). The irrestible conclusion is 
that the attempt to prove boundary by acquiescence is mere 
a recently-fabricated smoke screen for a naked trespass. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAN.AGES TO RESPONDENT 
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
The trial court awarded damages to Williams in the sum 
of $6,690.00, on the basis that appellants' trespass had 
reduced the fair market value of the land from $6,000.00 
per acre to $3,000.00 per acre. Williams' evidence of 
damages at trial included his own estimate, as landowner, 
of the property's value (Tr. 202); evidence of market value 
by Esbern Baadsgaard, a licensed real estate broker (Tr. 180-
87); evidence of soil, plant and stream destruction by 
Grant \~illiams, a forestry and land resources expert (Tr. 
147-65); and evidence of topsoil replacement cost by Alfred 
Johnson, a topsoil hauler (Tr. 58-59). By contrast, appel-
lants offered only the testimony of appellant Canto, a cat-
skinner, whose "professional opinion" (Appellants' Brief, 30) 
was that there was no difference in soil condition before 
and after grading. Absent any significant rebuttal testimony, 
the trial court was bound to award damages on the basis of 
the only evidence offered, viz., that of respondent Williams. 
Appellants attack the court's damage award on three 
bases. First, they argue that Williams' testimony, that 
the property was worth $6,000.00 per acre before the 
trespass and half that afterwards (Tr. 202), was improperly 
admitted, as it was unsupported by evidence of property 
values or surrounding circumstances. It should be noted 
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that Williams' testimony was received without objection;• 
therfore, its admission, even if erroneous, would not 
constitute grounds for reversal. Rule 4, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). However, the admission of Williams' testi 
mony was patently proper. This court was repeatedly statec 
that 
. an owner of property is always entitled to 
testify as to its value, and to express an opinion 
as to its value in condemnation proceedings. An 
owner does not have to qualify as an expert, nor 
be engaged in buying and selling real estate. 
Provo River Water Users Ass'n. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, lli 
*The transcript reads as follows: 
Q. [by Mr. Fowler] Do you have an opinion, Mr. 
Clark [sic] as to the value of the disputed 
property prior to the grading? 
A. Yes, it would be around --
MR. NELSON: Just a minute. I object on the 
ground that no sufficient foundation has been 
laid. 
MR. FOWLER: It's been established, Your 
Honor --
THE COURT: Just a minute. He may answer. 
I think under the law of this state the owner 
of property can always testify to its value. 
I don't think it's a good rule of law, Mr. 
Fowler, but I think it is the law. Do you 
agree it is the law? 
MR. NELSON: I am not certain, Your Honor, 
but will demur to your ruling (Tr. 202) 
The record thus indicates that the initial objection was 
withdrawn and not raised again, nor did appellants' counse. 
move to strike the witness' answer. 
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P.2cl 777, 782 (1943); see also Utah State Road Cow;i. v. 
Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976). That the instant 
case is not a condemnation case is irrelevant, as the court 
in either instance is attempting to arrive at a basis for 
awarding damages. 
The above general rule has been limited somewhat by the 
holdings in Utah State Road Comm. v. Johnson, supra, and 
Utah State Road Comm. v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1975), which ruled that a landowner's testimony lacks pro-
bative value if he is not particularly familiar with the 
property (e.g., if he has come into ownership of property by 
inheritance and has no realistic idea of its value). The 
limitations of these cases, however, are no impediment to 
admissibility in the instant case. Williams was raised on 
the property (Tr. 44), established a business adjacent to 
it (Tr. 109), and was intimately familiar with common uses 
of the property and how those uses (primarily recreation) 
were affected by the trespass (Tr. 106-106). His testimony 
thus carries great probative weight, and the court's award, 
based thereon, should not be disturbed.* 
Appellants next contend (Appellants' Brief, 28-29) 
*It should be noted that Williams' appraisal was very modest 
in comparison with that of his expert witness, Baadsgaard, 
who placed the property's worth at $23,000.00 to $26,000.00 
before the trespass (based on subdivision into four lots 
worth $5,500.00 to $6,500.00 apiece, Tr. 183-85), and 
$3,000.00 afterwards (Tr. 186). 
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that the admission of evidence based on the property's 
value as a potential su~mer home site was improper. 
Appellants cite no authority for their proposition, which 
is contrary to the prevailing rule, as stated in 22 Ara. J';: 
2d, Damages, § 133 (1965): 
It is the qualities and attributes of the real 
estate which affect its value. To the extent 
that other uses of the land in question would 
be more profitable, these other uses may be 
considered by the court to the extent that 
they affect the present value of that land. 
This may be true even though plaintiff has 
not taken advantage of that value. 
Moreover, the record indicates that Williams had taken 
initial steps to prepare the property for subdivision, 
including obtaining a well permit (Tr. 104) and discussing 
the possibilities of re-zoning with a local official 
(Tr. 132). Obviously, use of the property for summer home: 
was being seriously contemplated. 
Finally, appellants argue that since the Horlachers 
and Carter improved the property before it was graded, the 
damages should be reduced to reflect their efforts. In 
light of Williams' desire to build summer homes in a natur: 
setting on the property, it is questionable whether putt~ 
in a trailer court and outhouses constituted "improvements 
Moreover, appellants' argument fails to account for the 
differences in soil and plant condition before and after· 
trespass, as illustrated by the testimony and exhibits o' 
Williams' expert witness, Grant Williams (Tr. 155); nor 
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does it account for the extensive damage caused to the 
stream bed, including alteration of the property's natural 
drainage (Tr. 142), burying willows located at streamside 
(Tr. 145), and, in Baadsgaard's words, giving the creek 
the appearance of a ditch rather than a stream (Tr. 137) 
In sum, Williams has not sought to take advantage of 
improvements allegedly made by the Horlachers and appellant 
Carter. Instead, he has merely sought compensation for a 
wrongful trespass which, although instigated by the Horlachers, 
came to a head with the bulldozing done by Canto at Carter's 
insistence, thereby converting property once ideal for 
Williams' purposes into what is now essentially a desert 
(Tr. 153). 
If the court conunitted any error, it was in refusing 
to award damages to Williams on the basis of restoration 
cost, rather than diminution in value, evidence having been 
submitted to support both theories. 
The relative merits and appropriateness of these two 
measures of damages received exLensive treatment in Brereton 
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967), the court con-
eluding as follows, 433 P.2d at 5-6: 
... [T]he injured party [should have] the benefit 
of whichever of the two rules will best serve the 
objective . . of giving him reasonable and adequate 
comoensation for his actual loss as related to 
his.use of the property. This more flexible ap-
proach avoids a rigid application of either rule 
where it would result in confering a favor on 
the wrongJ00r at the expense of the victim; and 
it allows the owner o~ the property which has 
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been damaged the privilege which should be 
his of having the decision as to how he desires 
to use his property, by giving him the amount 
of damage he suffers on the basis of that use. 
If he wants to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood 
lot, or even a primitive area, though his pro-
perty may be more valuable if turned into an 
industrial or residential purpose, that should 
be his prerogative; and if it is wrongfully de-
stroyed or damaged, the wrongdoer should pay 
for the actual damage caused. 
This pronouncement, al though dealing with injury to trees, 
not the land its elf, adheres to the rule of the Restatemen'. 
of Torts, Second, Section 929, which allows plaintiff to 
elect, within certain limits, the measure of damages which 
will most fully compensate him for a wrongful invasion of 
his real property. Section 929, comment b, is particular! 
applicable to the instant case: 
Even in the absence of value arising from per-
sonal use, the reasonable cost of replacing the 
land in its original position is ordinarily 
allowable as the measure of recovery. Thus, 
where a ditch is dug without right upon the 
land of another, the other normally is entitled 
to damages measured by the expense of filling 
the ditch, if he wishes it filled. If, however, 
the cost of replacing the land in its original 
condition is disproportionate to the diminution 
in the value of the land caused by the trespass, 
unless there is a reason personal to the owner 
for restoring the original condition, damages 
are measured only by the difference between the 
value of the land before and after the harm. 
[Emphasis added] 
It is evident that appellant had such a personal re~ 
for restoring the property to its original condition, na~ 
to make it a retirement retreat or a suitable site for 
summer homes. Replacement cost would thus appear to lY 
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proper measure of damages. The record indicates that a 
representative restoration of topsoil would require approx-
imately 2,450 tons (Tr. 164-65). Alfred Johnson, a topsoil 
hauler, testified that the cost of hauling topsoil would be 
$50.00 per truckload (25 tons), plus $40.00 per trip for 
truck service, based on mileage from Spring Lake (Tr. 58-
59). A total of 98 trips would be required (Tr. 165). 
Thus, replacement cost, exclusive of costs of spreading the 
topsoil and reseeding, would total approximately $8,820.00, 
substantially more than the damages awarded by the court. 
Under similar circumstances, the Colorado Supreme 
Court, in Bobrick v. Taylor, 467 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1970), 
held that the cost of replacement of soil was an appropriate 
measure of damages in a trespass action, notwithstanding 
the claim of defendant contractor that the proper measure 
of damages would be the difference in market value of the 
land before and after the alleged trespass. See also 
Engler v. Hatch, 472 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1970), in which 
the court allowed damages of $1,000.00 based upon cost of 
reseeding and restoration cost following a trespass, al-
though plaintiff failed to prove that the market value of 
his land was in any way diminished by the trespass. By 
refusing to award damages on the basis of restoration cost, 
the trial court in the instant case showed considerable 
leniency toward appellants. 
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The court also showed some kindness in refusing 
to award punitive damages to Williams for Carter's willful 
and malicious destruction of property. The evidence 
clearly shows that Carter understood Williams' claim to 
the area now in dispute and acknowledged Williams' ownershi; 
long before he employed Canto to grade the property: On at 
least two occasions, he offered to buy the property from 
Williams (Tr. 93, 309, 315); he saw Williams use the dispu~ 
area for a family reunion (Tr. 318); and he ran a line of 
trailer hookups precisely along the eastern Skyline boun-
dary, as described in the deed (Tr. 18, 315) . Nonetheless, 
utterly disregarding Williams' ownership right, he graded 
the property, ruining it and causing a long-drawn litiga-
tion which has prevented Williams from putting the pro-
perty to profitable use. 
These circumstances fit all the criteria for an award 
of punitive damages, as discussed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975): 
In considering the problem of punitive damages 
and the arguments thereon, it is well to have 
in mind the purposes of punitive damages. They 
are: a punishment of the defendant for partic-
ularly grievous injury caused by conduct which 
is not only wrongful, but which is wilful and 
malicious so that . . mere recompense for actual 
loss is inadequate ... , and also that such a 
verdict should serve as a wholesome warning to 
others. 
In Kesler, the defendant claimed land and cattle under an 
instrument which erroneously conveyed more than was in-
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tended. The defendant gained knowledge of the error, yet 
persisted in claiming the land and cattle. At trial, the 
plaintiff was awarded $25,000.00 actual damages and 
$10,000.00 punitive damages. On appeal, the judgment was 
affirmed with a reduction of $5,000.00 in punitive damages, 
the court considering it pertinent to affirmance that de-
fendant's malicious conduct had caused a long and vexatious 
litigation, during the course of which plaintiff was de-
prived of his rightful property. 
The evidence in the instant case forces the conclu-
sion that Carter's conduct was equally outrageous as that 
decried in Kesler. At best, Carter was consciously 
indifferent to plaintiff's rights and to the consequences 
of grading plaintiff's property, such gross negligence 
calling for an award of exemplary damages, 22 Arn. Jur. 2d, 
Damages, §§ 249, 252 (1965). At worst, Carter acted wan-
tonly and maliciously. 
Despite the foregoing statements concerning restora-
tion cost and punitive damages, respondent Williams intends 
to abide by the trial court's judgment, which represents a 
just and equitable resolution of the parties' dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision and judgment of the trial court, quieting 
title to the disputed property in respondent Williams and 
awarding him damages arising out of the trespass and des-
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truction of his land, are amply supported by competent 
evidence. Conversely, appellants have failed to demonstra-
reversible error by the trial court with regard to any 
of their contentions. They have failed to meet their burdi 
of proof respecting deed reformation and acquisition of 
property by acquiescence, and they have failed to justify 
their lack of rebuttal evidence concerning damages. 
The trial court's decision and judgment merit af-
firmance in every respect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William G. Fowler 
William G. Marsden 
ROE AND FOWLER 
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